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AN ISSUE OF INVOCABILITY  
OF PROVISIONS OF THE WTO 
COVERED AGREEMENTS BEFORE 
DOMESTIC COURTS  
RAMESH KARKY* 
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Nepal had applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in May 
1989.  After the successful completion of accession negotiations, on 
September 11, 2003 the Fifth Ministerial Conference of the WTO in 
Cancun, Mexico agreed by consensus on the text of the protocol for 
Nepal’s entry into the WTO.  After Nepal’s ratification of the Protocol of 
Accession, Nepal has become the WTO’s 147th member on April 23, 
2004.  Nepal also has become the first least-developed country1 to join 
the WTO through a full working party negotiation.  Nepal’s entry into 
the WTO has brought many-fold legal issues which are required to be 
addressed sooner or later. 
  
 * Post-doctoral Associate at the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law, Canada;  
S. J. D., Golden Gate University School of Law, U. S. A.; LL. M., Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 
Belgium; Diplome in Law, Tribhuvan University, Nepal. The author would like to thank Prof. Mark 
Perry and the University of Western Ontario Faculty of Law for the Postdoctoral Fellowship. 
 1. Out of the forty-eight least-developed countries (LDCs), thirty were original Members of 
the WTO (previously GATT Contracting Parties). Now, thirty-one LDCs are members of the WTO 
and twelve others—Afghanistan, Bhutan, Comoros, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Laos PDR, Liberia, 
Samoa, Sao Tome and Principe, Sudan, Vanuatu and Yemen—are currently in the process of 
accession to the WTO. The remaining LDCs,  Eritrea, Kiribati, Somalia and Tuvalu, are currently 
not in the process of acceding to the WTO. Understanding the WTO: Least-developed countries, 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm 
(last visited Mar. 13, 2011). 
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The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (hereinafter 
referred to as the “WTO Agreement”)2 provides that one of the principle 
functions of the WTO is the administration of the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which is set 
out in Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement.  The Dispute Settlement Body 
(hereinafter referred to as the “DSB”) administers the Understanding on 
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter 
referred to as the “Dispute Settlement Understanding” or “DSU”).3 The 
WTO General Council, in a specialized role under a separate chair, acts 
as the Dispute Settlement Body.4 The Dispute Settlement Understanding 
regulates dispute settlement under all covered WTO Agreements.  “The 
DSB has the authority to establish panels, and to adopt panel and 
appellate body reports.”5  The Dispute Settlement Understanding states 
that the dispute settlement system “is a central element in providing 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system.”6 
The dispute settlement system of the WTO Agreement is available only 
to the Member states.  However, many times the root cause of the dispute 
brought by a Member state to the DSB is the interest of an individual or a 
company.7   
Historically, many nation-states have brought cases against other nation-
states in the international plane on behalf of their citizens under the right 
of diplomatic protection.  In theory an un-redressed wrong to an alien is 
considered as a wrongful act to his state and international responsibility 
arises in such a situation.8 The injured national may ask his government 
to espouse his claim.  If the claim is espoused by a state, it becomes an 
international claim.  The states concerned might elect to submit the claim 
to the International Court of Justice, to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal or to a 
special regime of arbitral tribunals established by the two states to hear 
  
 2. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO Agreement].   
 3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401 [hereinafter Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
 4. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT, 258 (3rd ed. 2002).  
 5. Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 2, ¶ 1.   
 6. Id. at art. 3, ¶ 2. 
 7. For example, a member state can impose safeguards (quotas or tariffs) under the 
Agreement on Safeguards to save its domestic industry from serious injury caused by high 
importation of certain goods and any concerned member state may bring a complaint against another 
member state at the DSB for such issues.  It is important to note that in this context that the final 
beneficiary of the WTO system is often individuals or companies. 
 8. See LOUIS HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS, 
680 (third ed. 1993).  
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all outstanding claims by nationals of one against the other.9  Generally a 
state may not espouse a claim based on injury inflicted on its national by 
another state unless its national has first exhausted all administrative and 
judicial remedies available in the defendant state.10  The rationale for this 
prerequisite is to give the allegedly responsible state an opportunity to 
remedy the wrong under its own domestic institutions before the claim 
can be elevated to the international plane. 
However, the practice with the GATT and WTO with respect to the 
exhaustion of local remedies is different than the normal rule of general 
international law practice.  The doctrine of exhaustion of local remedies 
by private parties does not apply under the GATT rule.11  Although 
GATT and the WTO Agreements are state to state agreements, it is 
different than other international treaties. It involves products and 
services and not private parties as such. However, there are private party 
interests in the WTO obligations.12  The International Law Commission's 
draft report on State Responsibility also supports this point of view.13  
The WTO Agreements have some provisions which are directly 
applicable to private parties.14  “Arguably, a Member should not be able 
to complain that another is denying substantive rights if that other 
Member provides the required procedural channels for the enforcement 
and redress of those substantive rights and the relief afforded by these 
channels has not been utilized by those complaining of the substantive 
issue.”15  
Hence, a system of invoking provisions of the WTO Agreements before 
domestic courts may be a good starting point to the DSB system because 
it will help to reduce the burden of certain types of cases on the 
international plane. A study on whether provisions of the WTO 
Agreements are invocable to the court of Member States under the WTO 
Agreements and national laws is valuable and contributes to the WTO 
system.  In this context the writer has chosen Nepal and its laws for 
reference besides the laws of other countries are in the proper place.  
Nepal has become a member of the WTO.  Hence, a serious question has 
already come to mind for many lawyers and judges in Nepal whether and 
  
 9. Id. at 691.  
 10. Id. at 693. 
 11. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 35 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2004) (1999). 
 12. See supra note 11, at p. 35.    
 13.  See supra note 11, at p. 35. 
 14.  See supra note 11, at p. 30. 
 15.  See supra note 11, at p. 35.  
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if so to what extent after Nepal’s accession to the WTO, any citizen or 
company of Nepal or any foreigner will be able to invoke any provision 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements before the Courts of Nepal?  
This paper examines and covers relevant provisions of the Uruguay 
Round Agreements and laws of Nepal, provides arguments favoring and 
opposing invocability and non-invocability, analyzes the constitutionality 
and validity of Nepal’s accession to the WTO, the direct applicability of 
the Uruguay Round Agreements in Nepal’s internal law, and the 
invocability of the provisions of the Uruguay Round Agreements before 
the courts of Nepal, and finally draws conclusion on the issue. 
II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF NEPALESE LAWS AND THE 
WTO AGREEMENTS  
Paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 
1990,16 (hereinafter referred to as the “Constitution”) states: “this 
Constitution is the fundamental law of Nepal and all laws inconsistent 
with it shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”  Paragraph 1 
of Article 126 of the Constitution further states: “The ratification of, 
accession to, acceptance of or approval of treaties or agreements to 
which Nepal or the Government of Nepal is to become a party shall be as 
determined by law.”  Likewise, Paragraph 3 of Article 126 of the 
Constitution states: “after the commencement of this Constitution, unless 
a treaty or agreement is ratified, acceded to, accepted or approved in 
accordance with this Article, it shall not be binding on the Government 
of Nepal or Nepal.”  
Regarding the provisions of invocability of treaty before the courts of 
Nepal, there is not any explicit provision in the laws of Nepal.  However, 
the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 has a provision on applicability of treaty 
provision.  Section 9 (1) of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 stipulates that “in 
case the provision of a treaty conflicts with the provisions of current 
laws, the latter shall be held invalid to the extent of such conflict for the 
purpose of that treaty, and the provisions of that treaty shall be applicable 
in that connection as Nepal laws.” 
  
 16. See THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL 2047 (1990), HIS 
MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF LAW, JUSTICE & PARLIAMENTARY 
AFFAIRS, LAW BOOKS MANAGEMENT BOARD, BABAR MAHAL, KATHMANDU, NEPAL 
(hereinafter “CONSTITUTION”).  Please note that this Constitution is no more valid and new 
Constitution has not been drafted finally yet.  However, aforementioned provisions of this 
Constitution were valid during Nepal’s accession process.  Furthermore, these provisions are the 
basic provision of any Constitution and will have such provisions in the forthcoming Constitution of 
Nepal.  Hence, still this provision has relevancy in analyzing the provision of invocability of WTO 
agreement before domestic courts. 
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Article XVI: 4 of the WTO Agreement stipulates that “Each Member 
shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative 
procedures with its obligations as provided in the Annexed Agreements.”  
However, neither WTO law nor general international law requires 
countries to fully incorporate WTO law into their domestic laws and 
make precise and unconditional WTO rules directly applicable to 
domestic courts and citizens.17 
The WTO Agreements include a large number of requirements in order 
to strengthen domestic judicial review and access to justice at the 
national level. Article X:1 of the GATT stipulates that “laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application, made 
effective by any contracting party, …shall be published promptly.”  
Likewise Article X:3 of the GATT stipulates that “(a) Each contracting 
party shall administer in a uniform, impartial and reasonable manner all 
its laws, regulations, decisions and rulings…., (b) Each contracting party 
shall maintain, or institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or 
administrative tribunals or procedures for… prompt review … .”    
Article 13 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
GATT 1994 states that “Each Member … shall maintain judicial, arbitral 
or administrative tribunals or procedures for … the prompt review ….”  
Article 23 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
also has same kind of provision:  “Each Member … shall maintain 
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures for … the 
prompt review ….”  Likewise Article 41:1 of the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights stipulates that “Members 
shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this part are 
available under their law….” and Article 42 of the same Agreement 
stipulates that “Members shall make available to right holders civil 
judicial procedures concerning the enforcement of any intellectual 
property right covered by this Agreement….”   
As the WTO Agreements include numerous precise and 
unconditional guarantees of private rights, such as the 
intellectual property rights protected in the TRIPS Agreement 
and the large number of guarantees of private access to domestic 
courts, these provisions obviously raise this question: if a 
Member State does not maintain these provisions in their laws, 
can anybody request the court of that Member State to invoke 
  
 17. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
SYSTEM: INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT 244 – 245 (1997). 
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one of these provisions of the WTO Agreements and decide the 
case accordingly? 
III. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF INVOCABILITY OF PROVISIONS 
OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS 
The WTO Agreement is made and signed by the Sovereign Member 
States: it is a kind of international law and thus is binding to its parties.  
International law asserts legal primacy over domestic law, as illustrated 
by Article 27 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,18 
and requires its performance in good faith.19  The European Union Law is 
also a treaty-made law which in many respects is directly applicable and 
invocable in the courts of Member States of the European Community.  
The example of European Union law shows the possibility of invocation 
of treaty law in the domestic court.   
Besides the European Union law, there are other examples of invocation 
of international law before a national court, i.e., Paquete Habana case20, 
Filartiga case.21  Countries like Germany and Switzerland recognize 
directly applicability and enforceability of the TRIPS Agreement in 
domestic courts.22  Furthermore, an individual may sue potential 
suppliers directly in national courts under the Agreement on Government 
Procurement.23  By these precedents, the chances of the invocability of 
the provisions of the WTO Agreements before the domestic courts of 
Nepal appear high. 
IV. ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF NON-INVOCABILITY OF 
PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS 
Equality among States and consent of the State is the basis of 
international law.  The WTO Agreements do not expressly state that the 
provisions of the WTO Agreements shall have statute like effect and be 
invocable before the court of Member State. Although WTO Agreements 
are created by Sovereign Member States, they do not have the nature of 
  
 18. See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U. N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, (1969) 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].  Art. 27 states: “party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” 
 19.  See id. art. 26.  See PETERSMANN supra note 17 at p. 22. 
 20.  See the Paquete Habana Case, Supreme Court of the United States, 1900, 175 U. S. 677, 
20 S. Ct. 290, 44 L. Ed. 320; 
 21.  See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1980, 630 
F.2nd 876. 
 22.  See PETERSMANN supra note 17, p. 21. 
 23.  See Piet Eechout, The Domestic Legal Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting 
Legal Systems, 34 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 11 (1997). 
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supranational law like European Union law.  Different treaties may have 
different implications.    
There is a major distinction between treaty and statutory law.  A treaty is 
a contract between states whereas a statute is enacted by a state 
legislature.  Moreover, generally a statute shall be effective indefinitely 
until it is modified or repealed.  The major distinction between a treaty 
and statute is that statutes intend to regulate society while treaties affect 
primarily international relationships.24 
“The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, in other words, to 
prescribe rules for the regulation of the society.  The objects of treaties are 
contracts with foreign nations, which have the force of law, derived from 
the obligations of good faith.  They are not rules prescribed by the 
Sovereign to the subject, but agreement between Sovereigns.”25 Hence, a 
treaty cannot automatically give direct effect (statute-like) to the law of its 
parties.  However, the parties of the treaty have responsibility to fulfill its 
obligations.  A party to a treaty may fulfill its obligation in many ways. One 
such way is the ‘act of transformation’ of treaty provisions into domestic 
law.  In this case, treaty provisions are incorporated into domestic law 
through amendment or enactment of law by a law-making body of the party 
State and are invocable before domestic court as a domestic law.  Hence, no 
argument suggests direct applicability and invocability of the WTO 
Agreements before domestic law and domestic court. 
V. DISCUSSION 
The laws of each Member country produce different roles for treaties in 
its domestic legal system.  Article XVI: 4 of the WTO Agreement states 
that each Member country shall ensure the conformity of its laws, 
regulation and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided 
in the Annexed Agreements.  This gives rise to the question of whether 
any citizen or company of Nepal or any foreigner would be able to 
invoke any provisions of the WTO Agreements before the Courts of 
Nepal.  To answer this question, we need to examine the following three 
sub-issues:   
  
 24. FLORENCE ELLINWOOD ALLEN, THE TREATY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
LEGISLATION 3 (1952).  
 25. See id. p. 5 
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A. CONSTITUTIONALITY AND VALIDITY OF NEPAL’S ACCESSION TO 
WTO 
“Accession” means the international act, so named, whereby a state 
establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a 
treaty.”26  “Accession occurs when a state which did not sign a treaty, 
already signed by other states, formally accepts its provision.”27 Sub-
paragraph 1(a) of Art. 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
defines treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States 
in written form and governed by international law….”  “Treaties are a 
principal source of obligation in international law.  The term ‘treaty’ is 
used generally to cover the binding agreements between subjects of 
international law that are governed by international law.  In addition to 
the term ‘treaty,’ a number of other appellations are used to apply to 
international agreements.”28  Hence, a Protocol of Accession to the WTO 
is a binding document as a treaty once an acceding country ratifies it. 
The power to accept the treaty is significant in determining whether a 
nation is bound by a treaty as a matter of international law.29  A treaty 
that is valid and binding under international law may nevertheless be 
invalid under the constitutional law of the participants.30  With respect to 
Nepal’s accession to the WTO, the Protocol of Accession is finally made 
ready by the Working Party and approved by the Fifth Ministerial 
Council on September 11, 2003.  The remaining final stage of the 
accession, i.e., the ratification of the Protocol of Accession also is 
completed by Nepal.  If the process of accession were to become invalid 
under international law or national law, there would not be any 
possibility of invoking the WTO Agreements before the courts of Nepal.  
Hence the question of constitutionality and validity of Nepal's accession 
to the WTO is directly related to the question of the invocability of the 
WTO Agreements before the court of Nepal. 
In accordance with the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990,31  the Nepal Government 
may issue full powers (letter of authority) empowering anyone to 
negotiate or accept or sign a treaty.  In the case of any treaty relating to 
  
 26. See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 2, para. 1(b).   
 27. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 607 (4th ed. 
1990). 
 28. See HENKIN ET AL, supra note 8, at P. 416. 
 29. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: 
INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 336 (2000). 
 30. See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art. 46 stipulates that “A State may not invoke the 
fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its 
internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.”  
 31. See The Nepal Treaty Act, section 2(b) and section 3 (1990) (Nepal). 
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the acquisition of membership to any such organization, or of any treaty 
that conflicts with any current law, Nepal or the Nepal Government may 
not become a party until a resolution is passed by the Parliament for 
ratification or accession.32   
Clause (1) of Article 126 of the Constitution 33 states that the ratification 
of, accession to, acceptance of or approval of treaties or agreements to 
which Nepal or the Nepal Government is to become a party shall be as 
determined by law.  Accordingly, Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 has been 
enacted by Nepal.  The important aspect of Clause (1) of Article 126 of 
the Constitution is that the law only can determine the procedural aspects 
of ratification of or accession to treaties to which Nepal becomes party.  
In other words, with respect to the treaty making, Parliament is not 
authorized by the Constitution to enact any such laws which will have 
substantive effect. 
Clause (2) of the Constitution states:  
“The laws to be made pursuant to clause (1) shall, inter alia, 
require that the ratification of, accession to, acceptance of or 
approval of treaties or agreements on the following subjects be 
done by a majority of two-thirds of the members present at a 
joint sitting of both Houses of Parliament: 
(a) peace and friendship; 
(b) defense and strategic alliance;  
(c) boundaries of Nepal; and  
(d) natural resources, and the distribution of their uses: 
Provided that out of the treaties and agreements referred to in 
sub-clauses (a) and (b), if any treaty or agreement is of an 
ordinary nature, which does not affect the nation extensively, 
seriously or in the long term, the ratification of, accession to, 
acceptance of or approval of such treaty or agreement may be 
done at a meeting of the House of Representatives by a simple 
majority of the members present.” 
  
 32. See id. section 4, para 4. 
 33. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16. 
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Unless a treaty or agreement is ratified or acceded to, in accordance with 
Article 126, it shall not be binding on the Nepal Government or Nepal.34  
The Constitution prohibits the conclusion of any treaty or agreement 
which is detrimental to the territorial integrity of Nepal.35 
In Nepal, the ratification process is described by the Nepal Treaty Act, 
1990.  In accordance with the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, Nepal government 
should table a resolution for ratification at the House of Representatives. 
The resolution concerning the accession must be passed by a majority of 
the Members present in the House of Representatives.36  Hence, as a rule, 
Nepal had to ratify the Protocol of Accession from the House of 
Representatives (Parliament) and informed the WTO. Thirty days after the 
ratification, Nepal would become a member of the WTO.  Instead of thirty 
days, Nepal got six months time, i.e., March 31, 2004 to ratify the Protocol.  
The House of Representatives was dissolved by the last elected 
Prime Minister in Nepal in 2002 and the date for election was 
not scheduled yet.  In such circumstances, Nepal had only two 
options, either to request with the WTO for the extension of 
ratification periods of time or to ratify the Protocol of Accession 
in accordance with the existing legal and constitutional frame 
work.  In the absence of the House of Representatives, the 
legislative power including the treaty making power still exists 
with Nepal as a sovereign nation, and Nepal can ratify this 
Protocol of Accession accordingly. 
Nepal could request with the WTO for the extension of periods of time 
for ratification until the formation of the next House of Representatives.  
The WTO General Council has power to extend such periods of time.37  
But there was not certainty of formation of next House of 
Representatives within the extended period of time due to the uncertain 
existing political environment.  Hence, this option was not logical.  
Finally, the Government of Nepal decided to ratify the protocol of 
accession in accordance with the existing legal and constitutional 
framework.  Accordingly, the Government decided to amend the Nepal 
Treaties Act, 1990 to pave the way for the ratification of the Protocol of 
Accession. The Cabinet (Council of Ministers) decided to add a new 
  
 34.  See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 126, cl. 3. 
 35. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 126, cl. 4. 
 36. See Nepal Treaty Act, section 4 (1990) (Nepal). 
 37. The WTO General Council has already exercised this power in the case of Cambodia's 
accession on 11 February 2004 and it agreed to give another six months to ratify its membership 
agreement. See http//www.wto.org/English/news_e/news04_e/gc_Cambodia_11feb04_e.htm (visited 
2/17/2004). 
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clause in Article 4 of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 through Royal 
Ordinance38 that will delegate the Government the authority to ratify 
international agreements.  The clause has also made a provision for the 
present arrangement to be automatically annulled once there is an elected 
parliament.39  After the issuance of Ordinance, the Government endorsed 
Nepal’s membership to the WTO.40  The Nepalese Cabinet forwarded the 
decision to ratify the WTO membership to the Head of the State on the 
third week of March, 2004 as per the Nepalese Treaties Ordinance, a law 
drawn into effect for the purpose.  The newly added clause in the 
erstwhile Nepal Treaty Act, 1990 provides for the King’s approval 
mandate for the country to become the member of the multilateral 
organization when the Parliament is absent to do so.41  The Nepalese 
domestic ratification process completed on March 23, 2004 after the 
King granted Royal Assent to the said Cabinet decision.42  This has 
resolved the constitutional deadlock, which could have cost Nepal its 
hard won WTO membership.43   
On March 25, 2004 the WTO accepted the submission of ratification by 
Nepal and announced “Nepal will become the 147th Member of the WTO 
on 23 April 2004.  Nepal will be the first least-developed country to join 
the WTO through the full working party negotiation process.”44  Finally, 
  
 38. See CONSTITUTION, art. 72(1).  It provides that His Majesty’s shall have a power to 
issue Royal Ordinance when the House of Representatives is not setting/working. 
 39. See KANTIPUR ONLINE. 2004-03-13; 
see http://www.kantipuronline.com/php/kolnews.php?&nid=9035 (visited on 3/16/2004). 
 40. See the Kathmandu Post, March 24, 2004; see http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/ 
2004/mar/arc_mar04_27.htm#3  (visited on 3/24/2004). 
 41. See March E-news letter on Globalization and WTO (2004) [SAWTEE FORUM], Vol. I, 
Issue 13, March 2004. 
 42. See the Kathmandu Post, March 24, 2004; see http://www.nepalnews.com.np/archive/ 
2004/mar/arc_mar04_27.htm#3 (visited on 3/24/2004). 
 43. In connection to the constitutionality of the ratification, Prachand Man Shrestha, Head of 
the WTO Cell at the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, says “Our constitution has a provision for 
making laws in absence of the House of Representatives and we have done so in the past 14 years.  
In case of WTO, if we are required to join it within a certain deadline, we can bring the ordinance 
accordingly.  But we have been cautious enough not to hamper the democratic system.  If the House 
of Representatives, after it comes into being, finds that the WTO package was not the right deal, it 
can still take action.  The ratification had to be done through the amendment because we have the 31 
March deadline.  If we fail to do so, we will be putting our country’s credibility at stake.”   “Despite 
the provision in the Treaty Act, we could not get the ratification done through the House of 
Representatives because it is not there right now.  But we are running out of time for ratification.  
After intensive discussion with legal professionals, we decided to make the amendment in the Treaty 
Act through ordinance so that ratification is possible.  The additional clause in the Act will be 
applicable only in case international organizations join, which have to be multilateral and that means 
only the WTO. The amendment also has a mandatory provision that we notify the House of 
Representatives within seven days of its formation about the changes made.  If dates for elections are 
announced, this provision will be null and void.  That is how we have tried to maintain the spirit of 
the Act and the Constitution.” See NEPALI TIMES, #189, 26 March – 1 April 2004, 
http://www.nepalitimes.com/issue189/economy.htm (visited on 3/29/2004). 
 44. See http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/al_nepal_e.htm  (visited 3/25/2004). 
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again the WTO announces “Nepal, on 23 April 2004, became the 147th 
Member of the World Trade organization.”45  This landmark decision of 
both the WTO and Nepal in connection to Nepal’s accession makes all 
Nepalese proud to become a member of such a prestigious and truly 
international organization.  So the answer to the question regarding the 
constitutionality and validity of Nepal’s accession to the WTO allows us 
to consider other proposed sub-issues. 
B. DIRECT APPLICABILITY OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS IN NEPAL’S 
INTERNAL LAW 
“Direct application” means that the international treaty instrument has a 
“direct” statute-like role in the domestic legal system. “Direct 
application” is very similar to “self-executing.”  There is distinction 
between “direct application” and “invocability.” There will be no 
possibility of invoking a treaty provision before the domestic court when 
there is no provision of direct applicability of the treaty provision.  
Invocability is possible only if there is provision of direct applicability in 
the domestic law.  When an international treaty is not directly applicable 
in the domestic law system, it requires an “act of transformation,” that is, 
a government action by that state incorporating the treaty norm into its 
domestic law.  Sometimes this may be called implementation of a treaty 
norm.  Even if a treaty norm does not prevail as a matter of domestic 
law, it will likely still be “in force” as a matter of international legal 
obligation.  Furthermore, it can have certain “internal effects” other than 
“statute-like direct application.”46 
Traditionally, a “monist” State’s legal system is considered to include 
international treaties as a domestic law. Consequently, a citizen of other 
treaty parties can sue as an individual in the courts of that country.  In 
contrast, in the “dualist” state, international treaties are considered as a 
separate legal system. Therefore, a treaty is not part of the domestic law 
and hence an alien only has recourse to persuade his own government to 
use diplomatic means to encourage another State to honor its 
obligation.47  Keeping these systems and concepts in mind, we need to 
examine the Nepalese Constitution and law to determine the nature of its 
system.   
There is no explicit provision of monist or dualist system under the laws 
of Nepal.  Paragraph 1 of Section 9 of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, 
  
 45. See http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news04_e/wto_147members_23apr04_e.htm (visited 
on 4/23/2004). 
 46. See JACKSON, supra note 29, p. 332. 
 47. See id. at p. 334 
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provides that in case the provisions to which Nepal has become a party 
following its accession conflict with the provisions of current laws, the 
latter shall be held invalid to the extent of such conflict for the purpose of 
that treaty, and the provision of the treaty shall be applicable in that 
connection as Nepal law. This provision of law is not enough to conclude 
that Nepal is a monist state.  The Constitution is the fundamental law of 
Nepal and all laws inconsistent with it are deemed void.48  However, the 
Constitution says nothing about the direct applicability of a treaty and 
has a provision stating that the accession to treaties to which Nepal is to 
become a party shall be as determined by law.49  The Nepal Treaty Act, 
1990, is not empowered to address more than procedural matters relating 
to how an accession process should be concluded.   
The direct application of treaties is only one of a series of legal 
constitutional issues relating to treaties and national legal systems.50  The 
practice of various WTO Member States towards direct application of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements helps us to understand the true nature of the 
Uruguay Round Agreements.  
The European Court of Justice has stated in the Kupferberg case 51 that 
“…in order to reply to the question on the direct effect52 of the first 
paragraph of Article 21 of the Agreement between the Community and 
Portugal it is necessary to analyze the provision in light of both the 
object and purpose of the Agreement and its context.  The purpose of the 
Agreement is to create a system of free trade ….  As such, this provision 
may be applied by a court and thus produce direct effects throughout the 
Community.”  But in the International Fruit case,53 the European Court 
of Justice concluded that GATT Article XI did not have direct effect 
because of various loopholes in GATT.  In the Portuguese Republic 
case,54  the European Court of Justice has stated: 
“… The agreement establishing the WTO, including the annexes, 
is still founded, like GATT, on the principle of negotiations with 
a view to ‘entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous 
  
 48. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 1. 
 49. See CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, art. 126, cl. 1. 
 50. See JACKSON, supra note 29, p. 335. 
 51. See HAUPTZOLLAMT MAINZ v. C. A. KUPFERBERG & CIE., Case 104/81, [1982] 
ECR 3641,at 3665. 
 52. In the European Law context, direct effect is understood as a provision of a treaty that can 
be invoked before the Courts of Member States. 
 53. See INTERNATIONAL FRUIT CO. v. PRODUKTSCHAP, Cases 21-24/72, [1972] ECR 
1219, 1227-1228. 
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arrangements’ and is thus distinguished, from the viewpoint of 
the Community and non-member countries which introduce a 
certain asymmetry of obligations, or create special relations of 
integration with the Community… some of the contracting 
parties have concluded from the subject-matter and purpose of 
the WTO Agreements that they are not among the rules 
applicable by their judicial organs when reviewing the legality of 
their rules of domestic law… having regard to their nature and 
structure, the WTO Agreements are not in principle among the 
rules in the light of which the Court is to review the legality of 
measures adopted by the Community institutions.”     
Under United States jurisprudence, some treaties can be found to be self-
executing, in which case they will be directly applied. United States 
courts have ruled that a directly applied treaty has the same status as 
federal laws (statutes, etc.) and that the latest in time therefore prevails.  
Thus, for internal law purposes, a later United States statute will prevail 
over the international agreement.55  “Regarding the Uruguay Round 
Agreements, it is not self-executing and thus has no direct “statute-like” 
effect in United States law, although the agreements can and should have 
an indirect effect on United States courts and offices when they interpret 
provisions of United States law.”56 In the Suramerica de Aleaciones 
case,57 the Court concluded that if there is a direct conflict between a 
United States statute and the GATT, the statute controls and the GATT 
does not trump domestic legislation. 
During the Uruguay Round negotiation, Switzerland initiated to require 
each GATT member to give the GATT direct effect, or some equivalent 
status, in its national law.58  This initiation was not included in the final 
Uruguay Round Agreements and it indicates that the GATT members as 
a whole still do not desire direct effect for the GATT.  In fact, the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Panel, in the US-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act 
1974 case,59 concluded that neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far 
been interpreted by GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing 
direct effect. 
  
 55. See JACKSON, supra note 29, at p. 341. 
 56. See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 4, at p. 244. 
 57. See Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C. A. v. United States, 966 F. 2nd 660, 667-668 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 58. See Kuijper, The New WTO Dispute Settlement System – The Impact on the European 
Community, 29 Journal of World Trade 49 (No. 6), 1995 at 65. 
 59. See UNITED STATES-SECTION 301-310 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, 
WT/DS152/R, Panel Report adopted by the DSB on January 27, 2000. 
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These illustrations make clear that a provision of the WTO Agreements 
cannot be applied directly as domestic law in Nepal.  This is because the 
WTO Agreements have no nature of direct applicability in domestic law 
and there are no practices of direct applicability in domestic law among 
various major states.  The laws of Nepal also do not provide for the 
direct applicability of such treaties in domestic law. 
C. INVOCABILITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENTS 
BEFORE THE COURTS OF NEPAL 
Paragraph (1) of Section 9 of the Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, states: “… in 
case the provisions of a treaty conflict the provision of current laws, the 
latter shall be held invalid to the extent of such conflict for the purpose of 
that treaty, and the provisions of the treaty shall be applicable in that 
connection as Nepal laws.”  As discussed above, Paragraph (1) of 
Section 9 of the Treaty Act, 1990, is not compatible with clause (1) of 
Article 126 of the Constitution and is subject to being voided under 
Article 1 of the Constitution if any body challenges this law before court.  
Hence, we cannot state only on the basis of the said provision of the 
Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, that there is provision of direct applicability in 
the laws of Nepal.  There will be no possibility of invoking a treaty 
provision in the domestic court when there is no provision of direct 
applicability of treaty provision.  Invocability is possible only if there is 
provision of direct applicability.  Besides this, the said provision of the 
Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, does not state that a treaty provision will be 
invocable before the courts of Nepal.  Even on the basis of Nepal Treaty 
Act, 1990, we can say that a provision of a treaty is not invocable before 
the courts of Nepal.  Concerning direct application, the treaty must be 
valid both internationally and domestically, it must be applied directly, 
and it must be invocable.60  Hence, we can say that provisions of the 
WTO Agreements are not invocable before the courts of Nepal under 
prevailing laws. 
The context, object and purpose61 of the WTO Agreements also do not 
give the meaning of direct application in national law and invocability 
before a domestic court, because they do not create absolutely binding 
obligations, but reciprocity and mutually advantageous arrangements. 
Other major countries’ practices also help us to understand the issue of 
the invocability of the WTO Agreements.  In the United States, no 
person (except the United States itself) has a cause of action or defense 
  
 60. See JACKSON, supra note 29, at p. 339. 
 61. See Vienna Convention, supra note 18, art 31, para. 1. 
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under any Uruguay Round Agreement and no person may challenge a 
federal, state or local law or action or inaction on the grounds that it is 
inconsistent with the Uruguay Round Agreements.62  
In Japan, in the so-called Necktie case,63 the district court’s decision to 
not allow invocation of a GATT provision was affirmed by the Japanese 
Supreme Court.  The European Community has also not given effect of 
invocability (we call it direct effect in EU context) with respect to the 
WTO Agreements.64  Hence, other major WTO Member countries' 
practices, the nature of the Agreement, and laws of Nepal support the 
view that provisions of the WTO Agreements cannot be invoked before 
the courts of Nepal.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the analysis of the above-mentioned sub-issues, we can 
draw an opinion   that the very nature of the WTO Agreements is 
founded on the principle of negotiations with a view to entering into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements but not on certain 
obligations like the European Union.  It is not a supranational law or 
agreement. 
The context, object and purpose of the WTO Agreements do not hint at 
direct applicability in domestic law and invocability before the court of 
Member States.  Other major member countries also have not given 
direct applicability of the WTO Agreements to their domestic laws and 
accordingly not allowed the invocation of provisions of the WTO 
Agreements before their domestic courts.  Even a Panel of the Dispute 
Settlement of the WTO (adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body) has 
stated in a case65 that the WTO Agreements will have no direct effect (no 
invocability).  
The Nepal Treaty Act, 1990, also does not provide for the invocability of 
treaty provision before the courts of Nepal. Therefore, no person, 
company, or any foreigner can invoke any provision of the WTO 
Agreements before the courts of Nepal.  However, in the future, if the 
House of Representatives (Parliament of Nepal) passes an implementing 
law that provides for the invocability of WTO Agreements before the 
courts of Nepal, the WTO Agreements may be invoked before the courts 
of Nepal. 
  
 62. See The Uruguay Round Agreement Act, section 102(c), (1994) (U. S. A.). 
 63. See JACKSON, supra note 29 at p. 358. 
 64. See supra note 53 & 54. 
 65. See supra note 59. 
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